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I. MOTIVATION
The interrelation between economic outcomes and individual health, e.g., individual disability, permanent diseases or other types of adverse health shocks, have been thoroughly studied in the literature (see, e.g, the review by Currie and Madrian [1999] or Fischer and Sousa-Poza [2009] , Kidd et al. [2000] , Wagstaff [2007] , Zhang et al [2009] for recent work).
Relatively unsurprisingly, the general (qualitative) consensus from that literature is the finding of a negative relationship between deteriorating individual health on the one side and wages or employment prospects on the other side.
In contrast, in this paper I answer a related, but somewhat different question: While I also provide estimates for the effects of individual disability 1 as a comparison, my concern is how individuals react to the disability of their partner or spouse. Such a reaction is intuitively plausible as the respective partner may be forced to increase labor supply to offset the earnings loss caused by their partner's disability or, to the contrary, may decide to stay at home and care for him or her. I also consider the question how a spousal disability affects measures of subjective well-being and to what extent people adapt to their spouse's disability.
The available evidence on labor supply is relatively sparse and exclusively from the US: Berger and Fleisher [1983] consider the labor supply responses of wives to their husband's illness. Their results indicate that depending on the availability of other income sources, specifically social transfers, the wife either increases her labor supply as a result to an adverse health shock for her husband if transfer payments are not available or decreases her labor supply to care for her husband if other income sources are available. However, their results are based on data from the 1970s, in other words from a time where female labor market attachment was considerably lower than today. Haurin [1989] , using data from the NLS for 1979 to 1981, finds no significant effect on a woman's labor supply when her husband's health worsens. Siegel [2006] uses cross-sectional data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey and finds adjustments of the labor supply of women, whose directions depends on the specific illness the husband suffers from. Her data, however, cover only older individuals between 50 and 61 years of age whereas I also consider younger individuals. 2 The only other study to consider the effects of a wife's worsening health on her husband' labor supply is Charles [1999] , who uses data from the first two waves of the Health and Retirement Survey, and finds evidence that men tend to reduce their labor supply in a reaction to their partner's poor health, whereas women tend to increase theirs. However, similar to Siegel [2006] , he also focuses on older individual who were between 45 and 65 years of age at the time of the first wave of the survey.
In this paper, I present first evidence on labor supply reactions for a European country and first evidence for women of all ages' reactions to their partner's disability using panel data from the German Socio-Economics Panel for the years 1984 to 2006. My results suggest that employment probabilities for both men and women are reduced by between 5 and 7 percentage points by their partner's disability, regardless of whether household net income is held constant. The effects are slightly larger for women, but are also quite substantial for men.
Conditional on being employed, I find no effect of a partner's disability on either (actual)
working hours or wages.
It is also well-known that disability tends to reduce measures of subjective well-being [2007] when it comes to individual disability (and in fact almost identical to their secondary results in the appendix, where they use the same dataset as me). However, both women and men do not seem to adapt to their partners' disability. While this result is hardly surprising for men as there was no effect to begin with, it is potentially relevant for women.
Econometrically, my estimates rely on the assumption that a partner's health changes are exogenous with respects to an individual's labor supply or individual well-being. This assumption seems relatively innocuous, in particular as previous researchers have often used the stronger assumption that changes in individual disability are exogenous with respect to that individual's life-satisfaction (see Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] for the case of disability, Wu [2001] relies on a similar argument when looking at heart conditions).
Additionally, I use fixed-effects estimators to control for unobserved heterogeneity and control for a fairly standard set of covariates, including work-and unemployment experience, years of schooling and socio-demographic characteristics in the wage and employment estimates and additionally for labor force status in the subjective well-being estimates. I use two measures of disability, both tied to the definition of a disabled person in German social security legislation. The first is an indicator whether an individual is considered to be severely disabled by German law. This is the case when the degree of disability, as determined by an official medical examination exceeds 50, which equals, e.g., the loss of a lower arm or the loss of a hand. Individuals with a degree of disability between 30 and 50 may obtain disability status when they would otherwise be unable to find a job (see §2 SGB IX, book 9 of the German social security code). The second measure is the degree of disability which runs from 0 to 100 (in steps of 5 or 10). The conditions that have to be fulfilled for a certain degree are legally fixed and are laid down in the Anhaltspunkte für die ärztliche Gutachtertätigkeit (see, e.g., Schillings and Wendler [2006] [FIGURE 1a TO 3b ABOUT HERE.]
III. DISABILITY, LABOR SUPPLY AND WAGES
In this section, I consider the effects of own and spousal disability on the probability to be employed, the (actual) weekly working hours and the natural log of the monthly gross labor income. The usual estimating equation can be written as
where α i and θ t are individual and year fixed-effects, X it contains time-varying control variables, ε it is a standard error term and D it is the respective measure of individual or spousal disability. Depending on the model D it contains either a dummy variable indicating (legal) disability status (Model I) or the degree of disability in a linear specification (Model II). In the case of working hours and wages, equation (1) is estimated using the standard withinestimator, while Chamberlain's [1980] conditional logit estimator is used in the case of employment probabilities. Standard errors are clustered at the person level to allow for arbitrary auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity within persons.
The included control variables are a set of dummies for household composition (which includes information on children), nationality and marital status, years of education and the years of full-time work and unemployment experience respectively. Equation (1) is estimated in two specifications, in-and excluding net household income, to gain an impression of the importance of income effects. These are potentially important as the results by Berger and
Fleisher [1984] suggest that the availability of income transfers may influence individual labor supply responses. Note at this point that my measure of net household income also includes transfers and other income redistributions through social security or the tax system, but also income from other sources, e.g., stocks.
The central question for the causal interpretation of τ is whether individual or spousal disability is indeed exogenous with respect to labor supply or wages. Remember from section 2 that changes in disability status during the observation period are the results of disease or to a much lesser extent accidents, while disabilities from war wounds and congenital disabilities are likely fixed at the beginning of the observation period. Note further that we can essentially rule out biological confounders that make individuals more vulnerable to disease and, e.g., intrinsically less likely to work as these should be captured by the fixed effects. However, there might be some issues with reverse causality when looking at individual disability, if, e.g., long working hours make individuals more likely to become disabled, for instance through strokes. While this possibility cannot be ruled out, it should be considerably less relevant for the partner's disability, which is the main focus of this paper. The essential assumption needed to give τ a causal interpretation in the estimations of main interest is that changes in a partner's disability status are uncorrelated with unexplained changes in individual labor supply which seems plausible.
Estimation results for the parameters of interest can be found in tables 2a for men and in [TABLES 2a AND 2b ABOUT HERE.]
For both men and women, the results show a reduction in the propensity to work for individual and spousal disability. These effects exist regardless of whether income effects are controlled for. Evidence on marginal effects from simple linear probability models suggest that an individual disability reduces the probability to be employed by about 23% for men and by about 18 to 19% for women with slightly larger effects being found when not controlling for income effects. A partner's disability in comparison reduces employment probabilities by 5 to 5.5% for men and by 5.4 to 7% for women, which is economically large. Looking at incremental increases in the degree of disability shows relatively similar results: For men a 10 point increase in individual disability reduces employment probabilities by 4%, while the same increase in the partner's disability leads to a 0.8 to 1% reduction in the probability of employment. For women, the corresponding values are a 5% reduction in the case of an individual disability and a 0.8 to 1% reduction in the case of a partner's disability.
Looking at working hours and gross labor income reveals a relatively similar picture:
Both working hours and wages drop after an individual disability for both men and women, although the effects on working hours are economically negligible, while there is no effect to be found for the partner's disability. Additionally, point estimates, in particular when looking at wages, are essentially zero.
To sum up: Individual disability leads to considerable negative effects on both the probability to be employed and on wages. The disability of a partner does not reduce working hours or wages, but has an economically large and statistically significant negative effect on the propensity to work. These effects do not differ much between men and women, which is different from the results found by Charles [1999] . Additionally, unlike Berger and Fleisher 
IV. DISABILITY, SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AND ADAPTION
In a first step, I use life-satisfaction regressions of the form
where α i and θ t are individual and year fixed-effects, y it is the measure of subjective wellbeing described below, X it contains time-varying control variables, ε it is a standard error term and D it is again the respective measure of disability. Similar to the previous models D it contains either a dummy variable indicating (legal) disability status (Model I) or the degree of disability in a linear specification (Model II) The included control variables are a set of dummies for household composition (which includes information on children), dummies for labor force status and nationality, years of education and work and unemployment experience.
Apart from the dummies for labor force status these are identical to the controls used in the previous section. I again use two specification, in-and exluding household income, to control for income effects. Standard errors are again adjusted for clustering on the individual level.
In a second step, I study adaption effects using three specifications. The first is identical to equation (2) using a disability dummy and adding the duration of disability in years. The second specification uses the degree of disability and the duration of disability in years. Both specification lead to the following estimation equation
where τ is the incremental effect of disability and δ is the average adaption to disability over time. Finally, I use another specification that allows the adaption to be different for different levels of disability. Specifically, I use the equation
where D it is the degree of disability and λ measures differences in adaption for different levels of severance.
The measure of subjective well-being is the answer to the direct question "How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered? Please answer according to the following scale: 0 means completely dissatisfied, 10 means completely satisfied." that is usually applied in the subjective well-being literature. I treat well-being as cardinal and apply the usual within-estimator. Note that Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers (2004) report a relatively minor impact of the choice between cardinal and ordinal subjective well-being. The central identifying assumption for the effects of interest is again is that changes in a partner's disability status are uncorrelated with unexplained changes in individual well-being.
Results for the basic life-satisfaction estimates can be found in tables 3a and 3b.
Individual disability leads to rather large losses in life-satisfaction, which was expected.
These effects are not primarily driven by income losses as can be see from the comparison of the estimates in-and excluding household income. Note that the magnitude of results is similar to the results by Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] , who considered Germany in a secondary analysis in their paper focused on the UK.
[TABLES 3a AND 3b ABOUT HERE.]
More interesting in the context of this paper are the results for the partner's disability.
Here, I find strong differences between men and women: While men are essentially unharmed by the disability of their partner, women experience a loss in subjective well-being that equals between 33 and 50% of the effect of individual disability. The effects are again stronger when income is not held fix, but remain economically large after netting out losses in household income. Interestingly, these results are very similar to the reactions towards a partner's unemployment found by Winkelmann and Winkelmann [1995] . A potential explanation for these findings, apart from hypothesizing that women react more emotionally towards adverse strokes of fate, could be that women are more dependent on their partners than men. If, e.g., a
woman's social status depends to a greater degree on her partner's social standing than it is the case for men, she has more to lose than income if that partner becomes disabled. While there is no way to test for such status effects with the available data, the fact that the results barely change when income is included make this explanation somewhat unlikely as income and social status should be correlated.
Consider now the results for adaption effects in tables 4a and 4b. For individual disability the results generally show evidence in favor for adaption effects for both men and women, although these are not always statistically significant. Note that this finding is similar to the results by Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] for the UK. The results also show no evidence that the speed of adaption depends on the severity of the disability.
[TABLES 4a AND 4b ABOUT HERE.]
For both men and women, the results do not show evidence in favor of adaption to their partners' disability. This result is not really surprising for men as there was no effect of their partners' disability to begin with. The case is different for women though: Given that they experience economically large losses in well-being through their partners' disability, the lack of adaption implies that these losses are permanent. Note that this lack of adaption is unusual as there is evidence that individuals adapt to marriage, widowhood, divorce, the birth of a child and layoffs with the usual exception being unemployment (see Clark et al. [2008] ).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I contrasted the effects of individual and spousal disability on labor supply, wages and subjective well-being using Results from fixed effects life-satisfaction regressions indicate that women but not men are harmed considerably by their partners' disability. As expected, I find that individual disability tends to reduce life-satisfaction by a considerably amount, which is in line with earlier evidence (e.g., Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] ). The results also suggest that men and women tend to adapt to individual disability in a similar way as found, e.g, by Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] , but not to the disability of their partner, which makes the corresponding losses in well-being by women potentially permanent. All these results remain virtually unchanged when also controlling for net household income (including direct and indirect transfers), which suggests that income effects of disability are not the driving force behind the observed effects. Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates control for age and age squared, education in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household type dummies and year effects.. Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates control for age and age squared, education in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household type dummies, year effects and the following labor market states: unemployment, out of the labor force, retires, other (with working being the base alternative). Full estimation results are available on request. Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates control for age and age squared, education in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household type dummies, year effects and the following labor market states: unemployment, out of the labor force, retires, other (with working being the base alternative). Full estimation results are available on request.
